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  INTRODUCTION   
 
It is an interesting moment to contemplate the future of 
North American labor law and labor relations. Canada and the 
United States initially adopted similar labor relations legal 
frameworks, the Canadian framework a variation of the United 
States’ 1935 National Labor Relations Act (generally referred 
to as the “Wagner Act” or the “Wagner model”).1 However, the 
Wagner model has played out very differently in the two coun-
tries. A key indicator of this difference is the divergent trajecto-
ries of changing union density over the last sixty years in Can-
ada and the United States. In contrast with the severe, 
sustained decline in unionization in the United States, Canada 
experienced a longer period of growth, slower decline, and—in 
recent decades—a fairly stable level of unionization.2
In addressing this question, this Article proceeds in six 
Parts. Part I briefly introduces the interconnected origins of 
United States and Canadian labor law frameworks. Part II 
surveys the unionization experience, and reviews possible ex-
planations for the persistent and growing divergence in union 
 Will the 
labor relations experiences of these closely linked nations con-
tinue to diverge, or will Canada’s labor relations landscape 
come to resemble that of the United States, and what might be 
the implications for labor law? 
 
†  Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The 
author thanks the Symposium organizers, Minnesota Law Review editors, and 
the archives at the University of Toronto Centre for Industrial Relations & 
Human Resources, Newman Library, for their valuable assistance with this 
Article. Copyright © 2014 by Sara Slinn. 
 1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 2. See generally Jeffrey Sack, U.S. and Canadian Labour Law: Signifi-
cant Distinctions, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241 (2010).  
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density between the two countries. Part III introduces two al-
ternative, but related, perspectives for explaining the different 
labor relations experiences of the United States and Canada, 
offering insights into their likely futures. These are John Go-
dard’s “Historical-Institutionalist” perspective, and Harry Ar-
thurs’ “Real Constitution.”3
Focusing on challenges to union security arrangements, 
Part IV introduces relevant aspects of the Canadian labor rela-
tions system and considers why past efforts to introduce right-
to-work (RTW) legislation have failed.
  
4
Part VI concludes by considering whether the Historical-
Institutionalist or Real Constitution perspectives are likely to 
be borne out in the context of contemporary events, and, specif-
ically, whether these attempts are likely to succeed. In short, 
despite the greater protection offered by Canada’s juridical con-
stitution, the question remains whether its “real” constitution 
has undergone greater, countervailing change reflecting a fun-
damental shift in the nation’s norms and values such that labor 
law will follow.  
 Part V provides an 
overview of significant contemporary changes directly affecting 
labor relations. These include: wide-ranging efforts by right-of-
center parties to achieve anti-labor legislative changes directed 
at financially undermining unions, restricting unions’ political 
voice, and promoting right-to-work legislation. Part V also con-
siders the labor movements’ recent countervailing efforts, in-
cluding: union mergers, using broader community groups to 
amplify unions’ political voice, and strategic voting.  
I.  ORIGINS   
Development of labor law in Canada has been indirectly 
and directly influenced by the United States since the early 20th 
century. Indirect influences include those of U.S. corporations 
and U.S.-headquartered unions (“international unions”) operat-
 
 3. Harry W. Arthurs, Labour and the “Real” Constitution, 48 LES CA-
HIERS DE DROIT 43 (2007) [hereinafter Arthurs, Real Constitution]; John Go-
dard, Labour Law and Union Recognition in Canada: A Historical-
Institutionalist Perspective, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. 391 (2013) [hereinafter Godard, 
Historical-Institutionalist]. 
 4. This Article employs a broad understanding of RTW, including chal-
lenges to union membership and dues payment protections, as well as re-
quirements for union financial disclosure focusing on the purposes of unions’ 
expenditures and time spent on matters other than collective bargaining. 
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ing in Canada and affecting the structures, institutions and 
practices of labor relations and the labor movement.5
The most important direct form of United States influence 
on developing Canadian labor law arose from efforts of Canadi-
an unions with links to U.S.-headquartered “international un-
ions” to pressure the federal and provincial governments to 
adopt labor legislation similar to the Wagner Act. As a result of 
the numerous international unions operating in Canada, Cana-
dian unions and the peak labor organizations (the Canada 
Congress of Labour (CCL) and the Trades and Labour Congress 
(TLC)), were acutely aware of the advantages the Wagner Act 
had brought to union organizing in the United States.
 
6 In the 
late 1930s, several provinces responded to this pressure by en-
acting labor legislation, which appeared to have been derived in 
whole or in part from a model labor law bill the TLC had draft-
ed and submitted to provincial governments.7
The federal government continued to resist intervening in 
labor relations with statutory regulation, which it regarded as 
an essentially private matter, and sought to maintain what it 
regarded as a neutral stance toward labor relations.
 
8 However, 
growing labor militancy, the rapid and growing political success 
of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation party (CCF) 
which had strong ties to the labor movement, and wartime de-
mands prompted two provincial governments and, shortly 
thereafter, the federal government to adopt versions of the 
Wagner Act.9 The federal legislation, Privy Council Order 1003 
(PC 1003), passed in 1944, effectively became the template for 
post-war labor legislation across Canada.10
 
 5. See H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law Without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 1, 35 (1996). 
 As Mark Thompson 
has pointed out, neither at the time PC 1003 was passed, nor in 
the 1960s and 1970s when labor legislation in Canada was 
 6. H.A. LOGAN, STATE INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE IN COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 1943–1954, at 9–10 (1956); Laurel 
Sefton MacDowell, The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations Sys-
tem During World War Two, 3 LAB./LE TRAVAIL 175, 180 (1978). 
 7. JAMES C. CAMERON & F.J.L. YOUNG, THE STATUS OF TRADE UNIONS 
IN CANADA 56 (1960); LOGAN, supra note 6, at 414–18. 
 8. MacDowell, supra note 6, at 180. 
 9. Id. at 189–90. 
 10. Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, Dominion Order-in-Council, 
P.C. 1003 (Feb. 17, 1944) (Can.). 
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modernized, was any serious consideration given to alterna-
tives to the Wagner model.11
The motivations for adopting the Wagner model differed 
between the two countries. In the United States the Wagner 
model was framed as an economic tool to relieve the effects of 
the Great Depression, while Canadian governments adopted 
this model as means of securing industrial stability and order 
during wartime and in the post-war period.
  
12
II.  DIVERGING UNIONIZATION EXPERIENCES   
 
The development of union density followed similar paths in 
the United States and Canada between 1920 and 1965, after 
which point the experiences of the two countries abruptly di-
verged.13
A. DIVERGING UNIONIZATION EXPERIENCES 
  
Between 1920 and the mid 1930s unionization in both na-
tions was in the low to middle teens, with Canadian unioniza-
tion rates tending to be one or two percent higher than that in 
the United States. The density decline in the 1920s reached its 
nadir with the Great Depression, followed by moderate growth 
during the early 1930s. Beginning in 1935, the year the Wag-
ner Act was passed, unionization steeply increased in both the 
United States and Canada. This trend continued to the early 
1950s, at which point union density in the United States was at 
31.7% and at 28.4% in Canada. Unionization then declined 
slightly in both countries until the early 1960s. At this point, 
and thereafter, union density in Canada and the United States 
has been on starkly diverging trajectories. Unionization has 
sharply declined in the United States, while in Canada union 
 
 11. Mark Thompson, Wagnerism in Canada: Compared to What?, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE XXXIST CONFERENCE 59, 61–63 (Anthony Giles et al. eds., 
1995). 
 12. See Godard, Historical-Institutionalist, supra note 3, at 400–02 (citing 
Bruce E. Kaufman, Why the Wagner Act? Re-establishing Contact with Its 
Original Purpose, in 7 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 15 
(David Lewin et al. eds., 1996)); Daphne Gottlieb Taras, Collective Bargaining 
Regulation in Canada and the United States: Divergent Cultures, Divergent 
Outcomes, in GOVERNMENT IN REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION-
SHIP 295, 300 (Bruce Kaufman ed., 1997). 
 13. W. Craig Riddell, Unionization in Canada and the United States: A 
Tale of Two Countries, in SMALL DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER: LABOR MAR-
KETS AND INCOME MAINTENANCE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 109, 
109–14 & tbl.4.1, fig.4.1 (David Card & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1993). 
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density grew until the mid-1980s. The United States has con-
tinued to experience a steep decline to the present time, while 
the Canadian experience has been of moderate decline and 
stagnation.14
Union membership of paid, non-agricultural workers 
reached peak density in Canada of 38.1% in 1985, while in the 
United States it had peaked at 31.8% in 1955.
  
15
In recent decades, the Canadian experience has been one of 
stagnation in union density, in contrast to the steep and sus-
tained decline seen in the United States. Current differences in 
unionization between the two countries are stark. In 2013, 
31.2% of all Canadian employees, including 74.6% in the public 
sector and 17.5% in the private sector, were covered by a collec-
tive agreement.
 Although the 
overall trend, post-peak, has been declining union density, the 
trajectories in the two countries have been very different. 
16 In contrast, 2013 data for the United States 
indicate that, among employed wage and salary workers, 12.4% 
were represented by unions, with 7.5% of private sector work-
ers and 38.7% of public sector workers represented by unions.17
B. EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENCE 
 
A substantial body of research has sought to explain the 
diverging courses of unionization in the United States and 
Canada.18
 
 14. Id.  
 Most empirical studies indicate that the relatively 
 15. Id.; see also John Godard, Do Labor Laws Matter? The Density Decline 
and Convergence Thesis Revisited, 42 INDUS. REL. 458, 461–64 (2003) [herein-
after Godard, Do Labor Laws Matter?] (regarding the variety of measures of 
union density and difficulties involved in consistently measuring and compar-
ing this phenomenon). 
 16. Calculations of union coverage based on STATISTICS CANADA, LABOUR 
FORCE SURVEY ESTIMATES: TABLE 282-0078, Labour Force Survey Estimates 
(LFS), Employees by Union Coverage, North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS), Sex and Age Group, Annual (Persons). Note that “union cov-
erage” includes both employees who are members of a union and employees 
who are not union members but who are covered by a collective agreement. 
See id. Due to the prevalence of agency shop arrangements in Canada (dis-
cussed infra) under which union membership is not required, collective 
agreement coverage is a more meaningful statistic than union membership. 
Also note these figures include agricultural workers. See id. 
 17. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union 
Members—2013, tbls.1–3 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://www.bls 
.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. Note that these figures include agricultural 
workers. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., Sara Slinn & Richard W. Hurd, Canada and US Labor Rela-
tions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
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lower union density in the United States is a product of lack of 
access to unionization rather than a result of lower demand for 
union representation.19 Many of these studies conclude that the 
level of worker demand for union representation in the United 
States is similar to, perhaps even greater than, that among 
Canadian workers,20 and that density in the two countries 
would be similar if U.S. workers’ desire for unionization was 
satisfied.21
Explanations for this divergence point to a wide range of 
factors including differences in political, governmental, and 
administrative environments; and differing managerial and la-
bor strategies.
 
22 Some commentators identify Canadian labor’s 
participation in federal and provincial social democratic par-
ties, and the consequent political influence labor has enjoyed, 
with the development of a more labor-friendly legislative and 
policy environment.23
In addition, stronger labor laws in Canada, relative to the 
United States, are commonly identified among the key explana-
tions for the dramatic decline in U.S. union density and the 
 
 
153 (M. Barry & A. Wilkinson eds., 2000); John Godard, The Exceptional De-
cline of the American Labor Movement, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 82 (2009); 
Riddell, supra note 13; Daphne G. Taras, Explaining Canadian-American Dif-
ferences in Union Density, IRRA 53RD ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 153 (2001); Leo 
Troy, U.S. and Canadian Industrial Relations: Convergent or Divergent?, 39 
INDUS. REL. 695 (2000). 
 19. But see, e.g., Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the De-
cline of Unions in the Private Sector, 1973–1998, 22 J. LAB. RES. 459 (2001) 
(identifying declining demand for union representation among U.S. workers as 
a significant explanation for falling U.S. union density). 
 20. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS 
WANT (1999); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN 
UNIONISM: WHY AMERICANS LIKE UNIONS MORE THAN CANADIANS DO, BUT 
JOIN MUCH LESS (2004); Seymour Martin Lipset & Noah M. Meltz, Canadian 
and American Attitudes Toward Work and Institutions, 1 PERSP. ON WORK 14, 
14–19 (1998); Rafael Gomez et al., Frustrated Demand for Unionisation: The 
Case of the United States and Canada Revisited (2001) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/DP0492.pdf.  
 21. See generally Gomez et al., supra note 20, at 8 (concluding that this 
unsatisfied demand for union representation accounted for about two-thirds of 
the Canada-U.S. difference in union density in the 1990s and that union den-
sity in the United States would have been twenty-three percentage points 
higher had this unmet demand been satisfied). 
 22. See Slinn & Hurd, supra note 18. 
 23. DONALD D. CARTER, LABOUR LAW REFORM: RADICAL DEPARTURE OF 
NATURAL EVOLUTION?, INDUS. REL. CENTRE PRESS CURRENT ISSUES SERIES 
3–4 (1992), available at http://irc.queensu.ca/sites/default/files/articles/carter 
-labour-law-reform-radical-departure-or-natural-evolution.pdf; Sack, supra 
note 2, at 244–47. 
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persistent Canada-United States density difference.24 Labor 
law is primarily a provincial responsibility under the Canadian 
Constitution. Consequently, the federal government has juris-
diction over labor and employment relations only for employees 
of the government, Crown corporations, and specified, federal-
ly-regulated industries. This diversity of regulation, together 
with the Parliamentary system of government, is credited with 
fostering a diversity of frequently changing labor law regimes.25
C. THE CHARTER CONTRIBUTION TO THE DIVERGENCE 
  
Recently, application of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (Charter), adopted in 1982, has emerged as per-
haps the most distinct legal difference between the United 
States and Canada.26 The Charter constitutionally guarantees 
specific rights and freedoms including, most relevant to labor, 
the freedoms of association (FOA) and expression.27 However, 
these are not absolute guarantees. Section 1 of the Charter 
provides that rights and freedoms are “subject only to such rea-
sonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justi-
fied in a free and democratic society.”28
During the first twenty-five years of the Charter’s life it 
provided little protection to labor. Notably, the Canadian La-
bour Congress had opted out of participating in development of 
the Charter, and did not seek to have labor rights entrenched 
  
 
 24. See, e.g., RICHARD N. BLOCK ET AL., LABOR STANDARDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND CANADA (2003); Richard N. Block, Reforming U.S. Labor Law and 
Collective Bargaining: Some Proposals Based on the Canadian System, in RE-
STORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 250, 255 (Sheldon Friedman 
et al. eds., 1994); Godard, Do Labor Laws Matter?, supra note 15. For a recent 
survey of relevant legal differences, see Sack, supra note 2. 
 25. See Paul C. Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 
23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 26, 31 (1986). But see, e.g., Kevin M. Burkett, The Polit-
icization of the Ontario Labour Relations Framework in the 1990s, CAN. LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 161, 162–63 (1998) (identifying these features as fostering parti-
san and extreme changes rather than constructive evolution of labor law). Ar-
thurs, discussed further below, contends that provincial supremacy over labor 
law has led to subordination of labor relations to trade and economic issues. 
Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 62. 
 26. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 §§ 1, 2(d) 
(U.K.).  
 27. This Article focuses on FOA rather than the freedom of expression. 
 28. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 § 1 (U.K.). 
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in the Charter.29 Indeed, with the exception of mobility rights, 
the Charter includes no labor or social rights.30
In 1987 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) issued a “La-
bour Trilogy” of concurrent decisions, holding that the scope of 
the Charter’s FOA guarantee did not include collective bargain-
ing or strike activity.
  
31 However, in its 2007 Health Services de-
cision the SCC expressly rejected the reasoning in the Labour 
Trilogy, explicitly overturning its interpretation of the FOA.32 
Instead, the SCC declared that the FOA provides limited pro-
tection for the process of good faith collective bargaining. The 
SCC also indicated that labor policy was no longer to be treated 
as a judicial “no go” zone; that courts would no longer broadly 
defer to legislatures in labor matters; and that the Charter 
should, at a minimum, provide the level of protection found in 
international human rights instruments that Canada has rati-
fied or to which Canada is a party.33
The SCC revisited the Charter FOA shortly thereafter in 
its 2011 Fraser decision.
  
34
 
 29. Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 
 Although the majority opinion in 
3, at 45–46. Larry Savage 
characterizes this as a strategic choice to avoid conflict with labor supporters 
in the New Democratic Party and in the Quebec Federation of Labour (the 
FTQ), reflecting the fragmented nature of the Canadian labor movement and 
social democratic politics. Larry Savage, Disorganized Labour: Canadian Un-
ions and the Constitution Act, 36 INT’L J. CAN. STUD. 145, 155–56 (2007). Ar-
thurs surveys a variety of other explanations. The Canadian Labour Congress 
is the central labor organization in English Canada, established by the 1956 
merger of the Trades and Labour Congress and the Canadian Congress of La-
bour.  
 30. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 §§ 1, 2(d) 
(U.K.); see also Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 45–46. Larry Sav-
age characterizes this as a strategic choice to avoid conflict with labor sup-
porters in the New Democratic Party and in the Québec Federation of Labour 
(FTQ), reflecting the fragmented nature of the Canadian labor movement and 
social democratic politics. Savage, supra note 2, at 155–56.  
 31. The Labour Trilogy consists of: In re Public Service Employee Rela-
tions Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.); P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 424 (Can.); R.W.D.S.U.  v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (Can.). 
The Supreme Court affirmed this position in Professional Institute of the Pub-
lic Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 
367 (Can.), and in Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 
989 (Can.). 
 32. Health Services & Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. 
British Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, para. 26 (Can.). 
 33. Id. at paras. 26, 70, 79. 
 34. See Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
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Fraser professed to uphold Health Services,35 subsequent inter-
pretation and application of Fraser has reflected a more re-
stricted view of Charter FOA protection for collective bargain-
ing.36
Health Services was greeted in some quarters as a triumph 
for labor, and produced a surge of Charter litigation.
 
37 Although 
unions’ turn towards litigation has been most marked since this 
decision, some commentators regard it as part of a broader 
strategic shift by unions towards using domestic and interna-
tional litigation as an alternative to pursuing political and leg-
islative change to combat legislative incursions on collective 
bargaining by governments that were increasingly hostile to 
labor.38 This litigation strategy was common in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, although unions’ interest in litigation had faded by 
the mid-1990s with consistently disappointing SCC decisions.39
III.  ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES: THE HISTORICAL-
INSTITUTIONALIST AND “REAL” CONSTITUTION 
MODELS   
 
Another stream of literature fundamentally disagrees with 
the previously described explanations for the United States-
Canada unionization difference. Although allowing that these 
other explanatory factors exist and may have some effect, these 
authors regard those factors as products of more fundamental, 
 
 35. Id. at para. 97 (“Health Services is grounded in precedent, consistent 
with Canadian values, consistent with Canada’s international commitments 
and consistent [with the] Court’s purposive and generous interpretation of 
other Charter guarantees. In [the SCC’s] view, [Health Services] should not be 
overturned.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, [2010] 
S.K.C.A. 27 (Can. Sask. C.A.), leave to app. granted; Ass’n of Justice Counsel v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2012] O.N.C.A. 530 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to ap-
peal refused [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 430 (Can.); Mounted Police Ass’n of Ontario v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2010] O.N.C.A. 635 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to ap-
peal granted [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 350 (Can.). 
 37. See generally Brian Etherington, The B.C. Health Services and Sup-
port Decision—The Constitutionalization of a Right to Bargain Collectively in 
Canada: Where Did It Come From and Where Will It Lead?, 30 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL’Y J. 715, 721–22 (2009) [hereinafter Etherington, Health Services]; John 
P. McEvoy, B.C. Health Services: The Legacy After 18 Months, 59 U.N.B. L.J. 
48, 50–58 (2009) (detailing various instances of Charter litigation). 
 38. Etherington, Health Services, supra note 37, at 721–22 (citing Judy 
Fudge, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively: 
The Implications of the Health Services and Support Case in Canada and Be-
yond, 37 INDUS. L.J. 25, 25–27 (2008)). 
 39. Id. 
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“real,” cultural, historical or institutional differences between 
the two countries. Two key examples of such alternative ap-
proaches are John Godard’s Historical-Institutionalist perspec-
tive and Harry Arthurs’ analysis of the “Real” constitution. 
A. THE HISTORICAL-INSTITUTIONALIST MODEL 
John Godard advocates a Historical-Institutionalist per-
spective, which looks to norms that have become entrenched in 
institutions through a nation’s particular formative history.40 
These norms become structurally embedded in institutions and 
power structures and cognitively embedded in how actors re-
gard institutions.41 This, in turn, leads to institutionalized dif-
ferences in the law.42
Godard identifies the significant historical-institutional 
differences between the United States and Canada as the es-
sential reason for the countries’ different unionization experi-
ences.
  
43 Godard explains that the history of the United States 
reflects a highly-individualistic frontier experience, giving rise 
to norms focusing on property rights, freedom of contract, mar-
ket rights, and distrust of state authority or intervention.44 
This, in turn, gave rise to a weak and conservative working 
class, conservative labor movement, general suspicion of “big 
labor,” and fierce employer anti-unionism.45 In contrast, Cana-
da’s formative historical experience was marked by Upper 
Canada elites’ concern for preserving order and stability, devel-
opment led by the fur trade, smaller companies, and the Royal 
Northwest Mounted Police, rather than the entrepreneurial 
capitalist influence in the US; and, at least in Québec, the col-
lectivist rather than individualist influence of the Roman Cath-
olic Church.46 Consequently, Canadian norms included greater 
acceptance of an administrative and interventionist state, valu-
ing maintenance of the status quo, and social democratic and 
collectivist views.47
 
 40. See Godard, Historical-Institutionalist, supra note 
 Godard suggests that the institutional 
norms and traditions that developed in Canada are more con-
sonant with the Wagner model than those of the United States, 
3, at 393–94.  
 41. Id. at 394 n.9. 
 42. Id. at 393, 399–401. 
 43. Id. at 400–01.  
 44. Id. at 394–95. 
 45. Id. at 395. 
 46. Id. at 397–98. 
 47. Id.  
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producing a more enduring labor relations system and support-
ing higher union density.48
However, Godard recognizes that these distinct institu-
tions have been eroded, pointing to ongoing changes in Canadi-
an political economy.
  
49 Looking ahead, Godard contends that 
current government attacks on labor will only have permanent 
implications if governments hostile to labor and the norms un-
derlying Canada’s labor relations system succeed in eroding 
these norms and replacing them with new beliefs, values and 
principles.50 Otherwise, the Historical-Institutionalist perspec-
tive predicts that policies departing from fundamental, histori-
cal norms are unlikely to persist and in time will revert to the 
nation’s historical trajectory.51
B. THE “REAL” CONSTITUTION MODEL 
 
Harry Arthurs has developed taxonomy of constitutions in-
cluding what he labels the “real” constitution and the “juridi-
cal” constitution.52 Arthurs contends that a nation’s history, po-
litical economy, demographics, and resources—what he labels 
the “real” constitution—are the key determinants of the system 
of labor laws and labor relations that ultimately develop.53 The 
“juridical” constitution, including the Charter and constitution-
al litigation, are not likely to overcome these other forces, 
which he characterizes as the economy and societies’ “deep 
structures.”54
Arthurs argues that the primacy of social and political 
forces over legal mobilization means that the organization of 
 Therefore, changes in labor relations are products 
of shifts in the “real” constitution—economic and social 
norms—not the result of changes in the law. 
 
 48. Id. at 408, 410. 
 49. Id. at 413–14. 
 50. Id. at 416. 
 51. Id. at 415–17. 
 52. See Harry Arthurs, The Constitutionalization of Employment Rela-
tions: Multiple Models, Pernicious Problems, 19 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 403, 405–
09 (2010) [hereinafter Arthurs, Multiple Models] (describing rights-based liti-
gation driven, valorizing, political, economic and enterprise constitutions). In 
Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, Arthurs labels the rights-based liti-
gation driven constitution the “real” constitution. 
 53. Arthurs, Multiple Models, supra note 52, at 407; Arthurs, Real Consti-
tution, supra note 3, at 61–64. 
 54. See Arthurs, Multiple Models, supra note 52, at 406; see also Harry 
Arthurs, Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers to Organize, Bargain and 
Strike: The Sight of One Shoulder Shrugging, 15 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 373, 
379–80 (2010) [hereinafter Arthurs, Shrugging]. 
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political and legal institutions become relevant as influences 
shaping these norms.55 As Arthurs points out, in Canada, these 
institutions tend not to favour labor and social interests.56 
First, the distribution of powers between the federal and pro-
vincial governments gives the federal government considerable 
power to organize the economy but little responsibility over la-
bor or social matters.57 Arthurs’ contends that this distribution 
of powers is ideally organized to subordinate labor and social 
policies to the interests of global trade.58
Second, Arthurs points to the “institutional architecture” of 
Canadian governments and, in particular, those branches and 
ministries responsible for setting and enforcing labor and social 
rights.
  
59 As labor ministries are diminished and reconfigured, 
responsibility for labor and social rights is shifted towards min-
istries of trade and finance such that labor and social rights are 
regarded as merely “residual by-product of economic policy” 
without inherent value.60 Finally, Arthurs notes the power of 
domestic and international courts and tribunals to prevent leg-
islatures and governments from implementing labor or social 
policies interfering with commercial interests.61
If the “real” constitution perspective holds, then Arthurs 
suggests that strong labor and social rights may be preserved if 
workers are sufficiently able to mobilize and protect rights 
through social and political campaigns. In short “‘real constitu-
tions’ are what we make them.”
  
62 Litigation, including constitu-
tional litigation will not provide the protection workers seek.63
IV.  HISTORICAL REJECTION AND RESISTANCE   
 
This paper has introduced two perspectives addressing 
how labor law and policy develop, and the conditions necessary 
for substantial change. Although the Historical-Institutionalist 
 
 55. Arthurs, Shrugging, supra note 54, at 387. 
 56. Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 62. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 62–63. 
 60. Id.; see also William D. Coleman, Business, Labour, and Redistributive 
Politics, in INEQUALITY AND THE FADING OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS 93, 94, 
111 (Keith Banting & John Myles eds., 2013). 
 61. Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 63. 
 62. Id. at 64. 
 63. Id. at 63, 64; Harry Arthurs, The Constitutionalization of Labour 
Rights: What Bliss in This Dawn to Be Alive 14 (June 11, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1634902. 
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and “Real” Constitution perspectives differ in some regards, 
they share the view that the political economy is the crucial de-
terminant. Both perspectives also recognize that attempted 
changes to labor and social policy may fail if they diverge too 
far from established norms or if changes are met with sufficient 
social or political resistance by citizens or workers. 
This Part provides an overview of the prevalence of differ-
ent union security arrangements in Canada and historical 
campaigns to introduce right-to-work (RTW) legislation. It then 
considers why these past efforts failed in relation to the histori-
cal-institutionalist and “real” constitution perspectives. 
RTW legislation has failed, to this point, to gain purchase 
in Canada despite repeated efforts by certain industry groups 
(primarily construction), anti-labor organizations, and certain 
elements in right-of-center governments and parties across the 
country since at least the 1970s. Unlike in the United States, 
where RTW legislation is widespread, no Canadian jurisdiction 
has yet adopted legislation limiting union membership or man-
datory dues payment. Some commentators regard this, and the 
widespread application of “agency shop” or “Rand Formula” un-
ion security provisions in Canada, as a vital difference in the 
two countries’ labor laws and a central reason for the wide di-
vergence in union densities.64
 
 64. See, e.g., Daphne Gottlieb Taras & Allen Ponak, Mandatory Agency 
Shop Laws as an Explanation of Canada-U.S. Union Density Divergence, 22 J. 
LAB. RES. 541, 553–57 (2001). 
 
Regarding membership provisions: “closed shop” refers to collective 
agreement provisions wherein the employer has agreed to hire only members 
of the union. “Union shop” provisions require all employees to join the union 
once hired (variations on “union shop” include “maintenance of membership” 
provisions, simply requiring existing members to retain membership, or “mod-
ified union shop” which doesn’t require pre-existing non-members to join), but 
new employees must become members and pre-existing union members must 
maintain membership. 
Some union security provisions only address dues payment. “Check-off” 
provisions don’t require employees to join the union, although the employer 
will deduct and remit dues for union members. Some versions of these clauses 
require individual union members’ authorization for dues check-off. “Agency 
shop” (as it is more commonly called in the U.S.) or “Rand Formula” provi-
sions, as they are generally referred to in Canada, don’t require employees to 
join the union. However, all employees in the bargaining unit are required to 
pay union dues or the equivalent, whether or not they join the union. Com-
monly the Rand Formula provision is accompanied by a provision for automat-
ic employer dues check-off for all employees in the bargaining unit. See 2 
GEORGE W. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW, ¶¶ 14.200–230 (2d ed. 2013); 
MICHAEL MAC NEIL ET AL., TRADE UNION LAW IN CANADA ¶ 2.90 (2000). 
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RTW initiatives are commonly fueled by agitation over the 
perception of widespread “closed shop” and mandatory dues 
payment collective bargaining agreement provisions.65 Howev-
er, although all jurisdictions in Canada permit closed shop ar-
rangements, evidence suggests that it is very uncommon and is 
likely concentrated in the construction industry.66 Currently no 
labor legislation in Canada restricts the use of union dues alt-
hough, briefly in the past, labor laws in some jurisdictions lim-
ited political uses of union dues.67 In contrast, existing election 
laws in several Canadian jurisdictions do prohibit political con-
tributions by unions.68
 
 65. See ADAMS, supra note 
 
64, at ¶¶ 14.200–230. 
 66. See MAC NEIL ET AL., supra note 64, at ¶¶ 2.90, 2.100. Note that in 
this Article the terms “collective agreement” and “collective bargaining agree-
ment” are used interchangeably. A 2007 review of union membership provi-
sions in Canadian collective agreements covering 500 or more employees found 
7.5% provided for closed shop, while 40.7% were “open shop,” containing no 
membership requirement provisions. Anthony Giles & Akivah Starkman, The 
Collective Agreement, in CANADIAN LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
283, 295 (Morley Gunderson & Daphne Taras eds., 6th ed. 2009). Notably an 
earlier, 1989, survey of major non-construction industry collective agreements 
found only 1.0% of agreements contained closed shop provisions. MAC NEIL ET 
AL., supra note 64, at ¶ 2.100 (citing DAVID ARROWSMITH & MELANIE 
COURCHENE, THE CURRENT INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SCENE IN CANADA 1989: 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REFERENCE TABLES 75 (1990)). These findings sug-
gest that closed shop arrangements are uncommon outside the construction 
industry. In terms of dues provisions, 46.9% of agreements contained a Rand 
Formula provision, while 46.5% contained another form of dues check-off pro-
vision. Id. 
 67. In Manitoba there existed a short-lived requirement that unions es-
tablish and apply a procedure to consult individual bargaining unit employees 
prior to using union dues for defined political activities. Labour Relations Act, 
C.C.S.M., c. L10, s. 29.1 (Can.) (enacted 1996, c. 32, s. 6; repealed 2000, c. 45, 
s.4), s. 76.1 (enacted 1996, c. 32, s. 15; repealed 2000, c. 45, s. 17); see ADAMS, 
supra note 64, at ¶ 14.370; see also MAC NEIL ET AL., supra note 64, at 
¶¶ 3.370–3.380 (regarding prohibitions in labor legislation on use of union 
dues collected via dues check-off arrangements for political purposes that ex-
isted in the provinces of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island in the 
1960s but were repealed in the 1970s). 
 68. See, e.g., Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 404(1) (Can.) (pro-
hibiting trade unions from making financial contributions to election cam-
paigns); The Election Financing Act, C.C.S.M., c. E27, s. 33 (Man.) (prohibiting 
election campaign contributions in Manitoba by “[a] person or organization, 
other than an individual normally resident in Manitoba”); Elections Act, 
S.N.S. 2011, c. 5, ss. 234(1), and 246(1) (N.S.) (prohibiting political contribu-
tions in Nova Scotia except as permitted by the Act; permits only “individu-
als,” the definition of which does not include unions, to make contributions); 
Election Act, R.S.Q., c. E-3.3, s. 87 (Que.) (limiting election contributions in 
Québec to “electors,” the definition of which does not include unions). 
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Right-of-center political parties in Canada have supported 
various RTW initiatives in discussion papers and platforms, 
and unsuccessfully introduced RTW bills. These are commonly 
introduced as private members’ bills, even where the party is in 
power, likely as a means of distancing the government from the 
issue. However, the RTW issue has generally been regarded as 
too divisive and likely to alienate constituents and voters to be-
come an issue these parties are prepared to seriously pursue. 
Right-of-center governments have declined to pursue RTW be-
cause of concern over the labor unrest doing so would provoke.69
Right-of-center government leaders have also decisively 
rebuffed RTW drives. For instance, at the 1977 party conven-
tion, Alberta Progressive Conservative Premier Peter Lougheed 
opposed a RTW resolution, stating that the province was not a 
“class society” and cautioning the Party that it must represent 
a “consensus” view of Albertans, rather than cater to a single 
occupational group.
 
70 The government also repeatedly assured 
the Alberta Federation of Labour that it did not intend to allow 
RTW in the province.71 Nonetheless, Premier Lougheed was 
prepared to take strong positions on labor law that were viewed 
as anti-labor, if not contrary to the Charter.72
That same year a RTW resolution to ban closed shops 
failed to pass at the British Columbia Social Credit party con-
  
 
 69. For example, in 1977 the Manitoba government declined to study 
RTW proposals in the face of the Manitoba Federation of Labour’s threat to 
call a general strike. See Errol Black & Jim Silver, The Threat of Right-to-
Work Laws and the Need for Social Solidarity, CCPA REV. LABOUR NOTES, 
August 2012, at 4, available at https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/publications/Manitoba%20Office/2012/08/Right%20to%20work 
.pdf. In the mid-1970s the Ontario Progressive Conservative government ex-
amined U.S. RTW legislation and considered prohibiting closed shops, but pre-
ferred not to resort to legislation because it would alienate labor. End to 
Closed Union Shops Studied, LONDON FREE PRESS, Oct. 14, 1976, at 4. 
 70. Gordon Jaremko, Tories Want Closed-Shop Practice Abolished, 
CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 28, 1977, at 4. 
 71. ALB. FED’N OF LABOUR, POLICY STATEMENT, SO-CALLED RIGHT TO 
WORK (1978). 
 72. For example, in the mid-1980s, anticipating that the S.C.C. would rule 
the legislation to be contrary to the Charter, Premier Lougheed threatened to 
employ the notwithstanding clause in Constitution to protect provincial legis-
lation denying Alberta public sector workers the right to strike. ALBERTA 
HANSARD NO. 69, at 1680 (Nov. 17 1983); Peter Lougheed, Why a Notwith-
standing Clause?, POINTS OF VIEW/POINTS DE VUE (Ctr. for Constitutional 
Studies, Alb., Can.), no. 6, 1998, at 10, available at http://ualawccsprod.srv 
.ualberta.ca/ccs/images/points-of-view/Lougheed.pdf. 
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vention.73 Both Social Credit Premier Bill Bennett and the Min-
ister of Labour Allan Williams had publicly opposed RTW and 
the Minister vigorously opposed the convention motion, later 
stating that had the motion passed he still would not have rec-
ommended RTW legislation.74 A subsequent leak of the Minis-
ter’s letter to the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations 
Commission enquiring about the state’s RTW referendum 
threatened to be a “political bombshell” in the upcoming pro-
vincial election.75 Concern over igniting labor unrest restrained 
this otherwise notoriously anti-union government from con-
templating RTW.76
Meanwhile, in Ontario in the mid-1970s the Progressive 
Conservative (PC) government examined US RTW legislation 
and considered prohibiting closed shop collective agreement 
provisions. However, the Ministry of Labour indicated that it 
preferred not to resort to legislation because it would alienate 
labor, and would rather reach some agreement on the issue 
with unions.
 
77 Later that fall, a resolution supporting RTW was 
endorsed by delegates to the annual convention of Provincial 
Building and Construction Trades Council of Ontario.78 Howev-
er, by the end of that decade, and motivated by several bitter 
first contract disputes centering on union security, the PC gov-
ernment introduced an amendment to the province’s general 
labor legislation imposing mandatory dues checkoff, the “Rand 
Formula” as the default union security provision.79
 
 73. B.C. Socreds Reject ‘Right-to-Work’ Law, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 28, 
1976. 
 RTW did not 
become an issue again in this province until the next century. 
 74. Id.; Rod Mickleburgh, B.C. Fed Plans Campaign to Fight Right-to-
Work Laws, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 17, 1977.  
 75. John Clarke, Leaked Right-to-Work Letter May be Political Bombshell, 
GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 17, 1979, at 8. 
 76. John Clarke, Right-to-Work Battle Heats Up, GLOBE & MAIL, June 10, 
1978, at 8. 
 77. End to Closed Union Shops Studied, supra note 69.  
 78. Trades Resist Right to Work, DAILY COM. NEWS, Nov. 9, 1976, at A3. 
 79. Bill 89, An Act to Amend The Labour Relations Act, 1951 (Ont.); Jef-
fery Sack & Howard Goldblatt eds., Compulsory Dues Checkoff Now Law in 
Ontario, LABOUR L. NEWS, June 1980, at 1. Notably, Dr. Robert Elgie, the 
former Labour Minister responsible for Bill 89, recently expressed dismay over 
current interest in RTW legislation in Canada, characterizing it as the first 
step in the destruction of free market collective bargaining. Tim Armstrong, 
Remembering the Remarkable Bob Elgie, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, May 9, 2013, 
http://www.thespec.com/opinion-story/2556586-remembering-the-remarkable 
-bob-elgie/. 
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The most serious consideration to date given to RTW in 
Canada occurred in Alberta in 1995.80 Responding to a private 
members’ bill asking the government to examine RTW, which 
passed by a single vote, the PC government established a com-
mittee of the Alberta Economic Development Authority to study 
the matter.81 The Committee was headed by a former PC Minis-
ter of Labour, Elaine McCoy, and included government, busi-
ness, and labor representatives.82 Not only did the current Min-
ister of Labour oppose labor law reform, but most employers 
and employer groups making submissions to the Committee 
opposed RTW on the basis that it would unnecessarily damage 
labor-relations stability.83 The Committee unanimously rejected 
RTW. It concluded that introducing RTW offered few economic 
benefits, and would likely produce labor relations instability.84
On occasion, RTW proposals have been employed by right-
of-center parties in election campaigns. However, these have 
not led to legislative change, even when that party won the 
election. For instance, the 2000 and 2003 re-election platforms 
of Mike Harris’ PC government in Ontario included a variety of 
anti-union planks, including proposals targeting mandatory un-
ion dues, restrictions on use of dues, and union membership re-
quirements.
  
85
The positions taken by these right-of-center leaders and 
governments in response to RTW efforts can be interpreted as 
reflecting the “Red Tory” tradition in Canadian politics, a no-
tion that has been described as “‘alien’ to the American mind.”
 Nonetheless, and even though the PCs won both 
elections, the PC government did not even introduce any such 
amendments to the province’s labor legislation. 
86
 
 80. See YONATAN RESHEF & SANDRA RASTIN, UNIONS IN THE TIME OF 
REVOLUTION 80–81 (2003). 
 
As vividly explained by Gad Horowitz: 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 81. 
 83. Id.; Allen Ponak et al., Alberta: Industrial Relations in a Conservative 
Climate, in BEYOND THE NATIONAL DIVIDE: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 267, 287–88 (Mark Thompson et al. eds., 2003). 
 84. Ponak et al., supra note 83, at 288. 
 85. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF ONT., THE ROAD 
AHEAD: A WORKERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS 1-2 (2003) (on file with the author); ONT. 
RED TAPE COMM’N, ENHANCING WORKER DEMOCRACY (2000), available at 
http://ofl.ca/wp-content/uploads/2000.07.01-Submission-LabourLawReform.pdf 
(document circulated among employer groups prior to 2000 election). 
 86. GAD HOROWITZ, CANADIAN LABOUR IN POLITICS 10 (1968). This sug-
gestion will be contentious, particularly as regards identifying Bill Bennett or 
the modern Social Credit party with Red Toryism. 
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At the simplest level, [a Red Tory] is a Conservative who prefers the 
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation / New Democratic party to 
the Liberals, or a socialist who prefers the Conservatives to the Lib-
erals, . . . [and] is a conscious ideological Conservative with some 
“odd” socialist notions . . . or a conscious ideological socialist with 
some “odd” tory notions. . . . The very suggestion that such affinities 
might exist between Republicans and socialists in the United States 
is ludicrous enough to make some kind of a point. . . . 
. . . The tory and socialist minds have some crucial assumptions, ori-
entation, and values in common, so that from a certain angle they 
may appear not as enemies but as two different expressions of the 
same basic ideological outlook.87
Union security questions, raising the specter of RTW, have 
only been addressed twice by the SCC: the 1991 Lavigne deci-
sion and the 2001 Advance Cutting decision.
 
88 Notably, both 
cases were decided in the Trilogy era. Lavigne involved a claim 
that a statutory provision permitting negotiation of Rand For-
mula dues check-off provisions violated the Charter’s FOA and 
freedom of expression guarantees.89 Considering the FOA claim 
only, the SCC unanimously found no FOA violation where dues 
would be used only for the purposes of collective bargaining.90 
Three justices held that a freedom of non-association is not 
Charter protected; while four recognized a freedom of non-
association as a Charter protected freedom.91
However, the opinions reflected very different views of the 
importance of the purpose of dues expenditures among the jus-
tices recognizing a protected freedom of non-association. Justic-
es LaForest, Sopinka and Gonthier held that in the context of 
use of union dues for purposes other than collective bargaining, 
the impugned provision constituted a violation of the freedom 
of non-association, but concluded that this violation was saved 
by Section 1 of the Charter on the basis that the infringement 
was minimally impairing, and made it possible for unions to 
participate in economic, social and policy discourse.
  
92
 
 87. Id. at 23. 
 In con-
trast, Justice McLachlin held that the purpose of dues expendi-
tures was not relevant because the purpose of the freedom of 
non-association is to provide freedom from ideological conformi-
ty, and regardless of the use to which the dues were put, simply 
 88. Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
211 (Can.); R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (Can.). 
 89. Lavigne, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 212. 
 90. Id. at 213–18. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 213–15.  
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paying union dues did not demand ideological conformity.93
The Lavigne decision is notable for its explicit distinction 
between U.S. and Canadian constitutional guarantees of free-
dom of association including recognition of the importance of 
the Charter’s Section 1, distinguishing the United States ap-
proach to union dues collection, recognition of the importance of 
industrial peace ensured by collective bargaining and union se-
curity, affirmation of unions as democratic organizations, and 
recognition of unions’ role in Canadian democracy.
 In 
sum, the SCC’s judgment found the provision to be constitu-
tionally valid. 
94
The second decision, Advance Cutting, involved a challenge 
to Québec construction labor legislation that effectively im-
posed a “union shop” by making union membership a condition 
of employment in the industry, as violating the Charter FOA.
 
95 
Although the SCC upheld the legislation in a 5 to 4 decision, 
the individual opinions were far less supportive of strong union 
security provisions than had been the case in the earlier 
Lavigne decision.96 Eight justices recognized a freedom of non-
association, and five held that mandatory union membership 
violated this freedom.97 Four of these five found that this viola-
tion could not be saved by Section 1, while the fifth concluded 
that it was a reasonable limit justifiable under Section 1.98
Unlike Lavigne, the Advance Cutting decision produced 
unanimous recognition of a freedom of non-association.
 
Therefore, this provision was upheld by the slenderest of mar-
gins.  
99 None-
theless, as in Lavigne, the Advance Cutting decision again ex-
plicitly affirmed unions’ valuable and legitimate role in demo-
cratic discourse.100
In short, the historical experience in Canada has been that 
RTW and associated proposals to limit collection or expenditure 
of union dues have failed to take root. Industry and other 
groups have not succeeded in convincing governments, includ-
 
 
 93. Id. at 217–18. 
 94. Id. 
 95. R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, 210–11 
(Can.). 
 96. Id. at 211–19. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 216–19.  
 99. Id.; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 211 (Can.). 
 100. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209.  
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ing right-of-center governments responsible for other wide-
ranging and significant anti-labor legislation, to pursue or im-
plement RTW or restrictive dues legislation. The long history of 
such efforts indicates that even right-of-center governments 
and parties in Canada have a tradition of respecting a diversity 
of views on labor, the role of labor, and, especially, the value of 
labor peace and the labor movement’s capacity to mobilize in 
protest. It was this “real” power of labor, and the power of so-
cial norms and institutions, including the Red Tory tradition, 
rather than legal or constitutional protections that has histori-
cally blocked adoption of US-style RTW legislation.101
V.  REVIVAL AND RESISTANCE   
 
This Part provides an overview of significant contemporary 
changes directly affecting labor relations. These include wide-
ranging efforts by right-of-center parties to achieve anti-labor 
legislative changes directed at financially undermining unions, 
restricting unions’ political voice, and promoting right-to-
work.102
Recent years have seen a new wave of activist organiza-
tions and right-of-center political parties aggressively pursuing 
a variety of anti-union (including RTW) legislation and policies 
at the federal and provincial levels. Governments’ role in, and 
reception to, these initiatives are markedly different from past 
experiences.  
 The following Part considers whether Charter litiga-
tion or the labor movement’s recent countervailing efforts are 
likely to successfully resist this renewed wave of anti-union and 
RTW efforts. In short, despite the greater protection offered by 
Canada’s juridical constitution, has its “real” constitution un-
dergone greater, countervailing change reflecting a fundamen-
tal shift in the nation’s norms and values underpinning Cana-
dian labor law? 
A. FEDERAL LEVEL 
The federal Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) govern-
ment, a right-of-center government in power since 2004 and 
holding majority government since 2011, has recently intro-
 
 101. Although the Charter came into effect in 1982, the Bill of Rights exist-
ed and could have been applicable. See generally Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 
1960, c. 44 (Can.). 
 102. Debra Parkes, The Rand Formula Revisited: Union Security in the 
Charter Era, 34 MAN. L.J. 223 (2010) (observing that “the Rand formula, while 
not under direct attack, is by no means sacrosanct in the political realm”).  
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duced a succession of anti-union bills. These include: provisions 
fundamentally restructuring collective bargaining for Crown 
corporations to increase Treasury Board control over negotiat-
ing mandates, bargaining, and collective agreements embedded 
in a lengthy and complex omnibus bill;103 a CPC private mem-
ber’s bill affecting many workers in the federal jurisdiction, re-
placing card-check certification with a mandatory representa-
tion vote, raising the threshold necessary for a successful 
certification vote, and resetting the default outcome of a decer-
tification vote to termination of collective representation;104 an 
omnibus bill including significant amendments to grievance 
and interest arbitration schemes, granting the government uni-
lateral power to designate essential services, and limiting bar-
gaining dispute resolution procedures.105
Although these bills met with some resistance from the la-
bor movement and the opposition, they had the clear support of 
CPC members of parliament and senators. However, with a fi-
nal piece of legislation, Bill C-377, there are has been strong 
resistance from within the CPC party and from CPC statesmen 
such as Senator Hugh Segal.
  
106
Bill C-377 is one of the most direct legislative attacks on 
unions Canada has seen and it is regarded as laying the 
groundwork for RTW legislation. The CPC government has 
been pursing passage of Bill C-377 since fall 2011.
 
107
 
 103. Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 1, S.C. 2013, c. 33 (Can.). 
 Introduced 
as a CPC private members’ bill, it clearly has the Prime Minis-
ter’s support. C-377 requires all “labour organizations” (includ-
ing unions and other organizations such as councils and con-
gresses) and “labour trusts” to report detailed financial 
 104. Bill C-525, Employees’ Voting Rights Act, 2013 (Can.). 
 105. Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2, S.C. 2013, c. 40 (Can.). 
 106. 148 PARL. DEB., H.C. (No. 175) (June 17, 2013) pp. 4297–98 (Can.) 
(Statement of Hon. Hugh Segal), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/ 
Sen/Chamber/411/Debates/pdf/175db_2013-06-17-e.pdf; Bill C-377, An Act to 
Amend the Income Tax Act (Requirements for Labour Organizations), 2011 
(Can.). 
 107. Bill C-377 was introduced, in its first incarnation, as Bill C-317, An 
Act to Amend the Income Tax Act (Labour Organizations), 2011 (Can.), in Oc-
tober 2011. However, it failed at second reading because it was found to be 
improperly before the House. It was subsequently reintroduced as Bill C-377, 
in December 2011. See 146 PARL. DEB., Sen. (No. 44) (Nov. 4, 2011) p. 2984 
(Can.) (Speaker’s ruling), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/House 
Publications/Publication.aspx?Pub=Hansard&Doc=44&Parl=41&Ses=1& 
Language=E&Mode=1. 
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information to the Minister of Finance.108 The Ministry will 
make this information publicly available, including in a 
searchable format on a Ministry website.109 Contravention of 
these requirements would be a summary conviction offence, at-
tracting a fine of $1000 per day of non-compliance, to a maxi-
mum of $25,000.110 C-377 requires unions to disclose a great 
deal of information revealing how they spend their funds and 
the amount of time key individuals spend on different activi-
ties.111
Although C-377 passed the House of Commons in Decem-
ber 2012 with no CPC Minister of Parliament voting against 
the Bill,
 The clear purpose of C-377 is to provide anti-union 
groups and governments with detailed information about union 
activities and expenditures in order to challenge the legitimacy 
(and perhaps legality) of unions’ use of union dues for purposes 
outside narrow labor relations purpose and, more broadly, the 
legitimacy of unions’ participation in activities beyond the im-
mediate workplace. 
112 it met significant resistance in the Senate, including 
from prominent Senators in the CPC Caucus. Primary among 
these was CPC Senator Hugh Segal. Senator Segal strongly ob-
jected to C-377 in the Senate, denouncing it as “[b]ad legisla-
tion, bad public policy and a diminution of both the order and 
the freedom that should exist in any democratic, pluralist and 
mixed-market society” and contended that this Bill “is not who 
we are as Canadians. It is time this chamber said so.”113
  As a Tory, I believe that society prospers when different views 
about the public agenda, on the left and the right, are advanced by 
different groups, individuals and interests. Debate between opposing 
groups in this chamber, in [the House of Commons] and in broader 
society is the essence of democracy. Limiting that debate as to scope 
 Sena-
tor Segal’s remarks, set out at some length below, reflect and 
invoke the traditional Red Tory conservatism and recognition 
of unions as legitimate—and valuable—participants in demo-
cratic dialogue: 
 
 108. Bill C-377. 
 109. Id. at c. 149.01(4).  
 110. Id. at c. 149.01(2.31). 
 111. Id. at c. 149.01(3).  
 112. 146 PARL. DEB. H.C. (No. 197) (December 12, 2012) pp. 13250 (Can.) 
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub= 
Hansard&Doc=197&Parl=41&Ses=1&Language=E&Mode=1 
 113. 148 PARL. DEB., Sen. (No. 138) (Feb. 14, 2011) pp. 3291–92 (Can.) 
(statement of Hon. Hugh Segal), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/ 
Sen/Chamber/411/Debates/138db_2013-02-14-e.htm#41. 
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and breadth is never in the long-term interest of a free and orderly 
society.114
Senator Segal objected to C-377 as contrary to the values of 
Canadian conservatism: 
 
The conservatism I absorbed and supported from leaders like Daniel 
Johnson—the father, not the son—Jean-Jacques Bertrand and Jean 
Charest in Québec; John Robarts and Bill Davis in Ontario; Bob Stan-
field in Nova Scotia and Ottawa; Peter Lougheed in Alberta; Richard 
Hatfield in New Brunswick; Angus MacLean in Prince Edward Is-
land; and Brian Mulroney and Stephen Harper in Ottawa is an inclu-
sive view of society, where there is room in the debate about our eco-
nomic choices, preferences and future in this country for all. 
  Hobbling one part of the debate is not what mainstream Con-
servatives should ever want to do to legislators at any time. There 
will be agreements, disagreements on occasion, difficult strikes and 
challenging choices. However, the civility of that debate is sustained 
by how open it is to all who are legitimate stakeholders in any eco-
nomic outcome. Trade unions and public sector unions are part of 
those stakeholders, and they are legitimate. 
  Conservatism in the Canadian Tory context is not about the pro-
tection of class or the oppression of labour by capital or capital by la-
bour; it is about a freedom tied to mutual respect, whatever legiti-
mate disagreements, between all the participants in the mixed free-
market system. This bill before us, whatever may have been its laud-
able transparency goals, is really—through drafting sins of omission 
and commission—an expression of statutory contempt for the working 
men and women in our trade unions and for the trade unions them-
selves and their right under federal and provincial law to organize.115
In mid-June 2013 the Standing Senate Committee on 
Banking, Trade and Commerce reported to the Senate, noting 
“the vast majority of testimony and submissions raised serious 
concerns about this legislation.”
 
116
 
 114. Id. at 3291. 
 Five provinces, reflecting a 
 115. 148 PARL. DEB., Sen. (No. 175) (June 17, 2013) pp. 4297–98 (Can.), 
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/411/Debates/pdf/ 
175db_2013-06-17-e.pdf. 
 116. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, TRADE AND COMMERCE REPORT TO 
SENATE, OBSERVATIONS TO THE THIRTEENTH REPORT, June 13, 2013, Sen. 174, 
at p. 2648 (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/ 
411/Journals/174jr_2013-06-13-e.htm. 
Numerous individuals (including law professors), organizations (including 
the Canadian Bar Association, the Federation of Law Societies, and the Cana-
dian Association of Labour Lawyers), the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
and five provincial governments raised serious concerns with Bill C-377 before 
the Senate Committee. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada was among the 
objectors, citing privacy concerns over the scope of disclosure and provision of 
individual’s names. PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, APPEARANCE BE-
FORE THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON BANKING, TRADE AND COMMERCE 
ON THE STUDY ON BILL C-377, AN ACT TO AMEND THE INCOME TAX ACT (RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS) May 29, 2013, Sen. 35 (opening 
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spectrum of political parties in power, brought objections to the 
Committee.117 As described by the Honourable Senator Cowan, 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate: “All [of these provinces] 
said that the bill is not constitutional, is not needed and would 
negatively disrupt labour relations in the province. Not one 
province wrote in or sent a representative to argue that the bill 
is a constitutional exercise of federal jurisdiction and should be 
passed.”118
Thereafter, Senator Segal successfully proposed amend-
ments to C-377 limiting the Bill’s application with more than a 
third of the PC caucus voting in favor. However, the Prime 
Minister prorogued Parliament shortly thereafter, and reintro-
duced Bill C-377 in Senate, in its original form and without the 
Segal amendments, the day after the new session commenced 
in October 2013.
  
119
The CPC’s fall 2013 convention provided more evidence 
that the values of the federal CPC party have shifted decisively 
away from Senator Segal’s Red Tory values. At the convention 
six anti-labor policy resolutions were passed.
  
120
 
statement of Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Comm’r) (Can.), available at http:// 
www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2013/parl_20130529_e.asp. 
 Several over-
lapped but, in summary, included: supporting greater union fi-
nancial reporting requirements, including requiring unions to 
detail budget allocations to “political donations, donations to 
media organization, and to political activism and campaigns”; 
permitting union members to opt out of union dues allocated to 
donations to media organization or political uses or activism; 
preventing mandatorily collected dues from being used to fund 
political causes unrelated to the workplace; modifying the Par-
ty’s statement of policy to provide that the CPC “believes that 
 117. Representatives of Nova Scotia and Manitoba (each with NDP gov-
ernments) testified before the Committee. Minister of Labour from Ontario 
(Liberal government), New Brunswick (Progressive Conservative government), 
and Québec (Parti Québécois minority government) filed written submissions 
with the Committee. COMMITTEE ON BANKING, TRADE, AND COMMERCE, PRO-
CEEDINGS ON BILL C-377, June 6, 2013, Sen. 36, (Can.), available at http:// 
www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/411/banc/pdf/36issue.pdf. 
 118. 148 PARL. DEB., Sen. (No. 176) (June 18, 2013) p. 4321 (Can.), availa-
ble at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/411/Debates/pdf/176db_ 
2013-06-18-e.pdf.  
 119. At the time of this writing, Bill C-377 is at second reading (for the se-
cond time) in the Senate.  
 120. CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA, POLICY FLOOR RESOLUTIONS: 
CANADA’S SOCIAL FABRIC, Res. 1-06-015; 1-15-159; 2-22-004; 3-01-066; 3-02-
069; and 3-19-077 (2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/147373792/ 
Policy-Resolutions-2013-Conservative-Party-of-Canada-Convention. 
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mandatory union membership and forced financial contribu-
tions as a condition of employment limit the economic freedom 
of Canadians and stifle economic growth”; and explicitly calling 
for right to work legislation.121
B. ONTARIO  
 
The PC Party of Ontario currently serves as the Official 
Opposition. The Liberal Party has formed the government since 
2003, although only winning a minority government in the 
2007 and 2011 elections. The PCs, under leader Tim Hudak, 
have adopted an aggressive anti-union approach, including ex-
plicit support for RTW and associated policies and a series of 
bills reflecting these priorities.122
The Party’s policy explicitly includes eliminating legisla-
tive support for union membership or dues as a condition of 
employment, employer dues check-off, and introducing statuto-
ry requirements for unions to publicly disclose detailed finan-
cial information.
  
123 Similarly, at the Party’s Fall 2013 policy 
conference, a resolution to seek to end mandatory union mem-
bership passed with the support of 53% of voting delegates, alt-
hough some delegates were concerned about alienating voters 
with such anti-worker policies.124
The PC party has also introduced a series of bills (none of 
which passed) proposing anti-labor amendments to the OLRA 
centering on provisions dealing with union membership and 
dues.
 
125
 
 121. Id. 
 These bills proposed restricting dues check-off provi-
sions to funds used for the purpose of collective bargaining; re-
moving explicit statutory permission for parties to negotiate 
 122. Hudak subsequently retreated from this position, after months of in-
tense pressure from the Party. Adrian Morrow, Hudak Backs Down on Anti-
Union Proposal, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 6, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail 
.com/news/politics/ontario-tories-facing-internal-dissent-over-right-to-work 
-laws/article16725250/ (suggesting the PCs enthusiasm for right to work legis-
lation was waning by early 2014).  
 123. ONT. PC CAUCUS, PATHS TO PROSPERITY: FLEXIBLE LABOUR MARKETS 
19 (2012), available at http://ontariopc.uberflip.com/i/103096. 
 124. Maria Babbage, Hudak Won’t Back Down on Controversial Union Pol-
icies, Despite Split in Party, RECORD, Sept. 29, 2013, http://www.therecord 
.com/news-story/4131181-hudak-won-t-back-down-on-controversial-union 
-policies-despite-split-in-party/. 
 125. Bill 64, Defending Employees’ Rights Act (Collective Bargaining and 
Financial Disclosure by Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.); Bill 78, Defending Em-
ployees’ Rights Act (Collective Bargaining and Financial Disclosure by Trade 
Unions), 2012 (Ont.); Bill 71, Defending Employees’ Rights Act, 2010 (Ont.). 
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certain union security and deeming any such terms provisions 
to be void; and requiring every union that is party to a collec-
tive agreement (whether certified or not) to file detailed finan-
cial information with the Minister of Labour which then would 
be made publicly available.126
The Ontario PCs also introduced bills proposing broader 
anti-labor amendments to the OLRA including eliminating un-
ions’ exclusive representation in bargaining by making collec-
tive agreements binding only on union members;
 
127 prohibiting 
card-check and remedial certification;128 extending the cam-
paign period in representation votes; restricting strikes in the 
construction industry; replacing the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board’s (OLRB) authority to determine practice and procedures 
with regulations made by the Lieutenant Governor in Council; 
introducing a right to appeal OLRB decisions; making OLRB 
members and officers, the Minister of Labour, and any Ministry 
officials compellable witnesses before a court or tribunal;129 
shifting the burden of proof in all unfair labor practice com-
plaints to the employer;130 and limiting bargaining rights in the 
construction sector.131
C. RESISTANCE: CHARTER LITIGATION 
 
As discussed earlier, Charter litigation has been a tool la-
bor has resorted to in the past in the face of hostile govern-
ments, policy, and legislation. While the early years of the 
Charter offered little support to labor, the 2007 Health Services 
decision reinvigorated the Charter as a possible means for pro-
tecting and perhaps even advancing labor rights. 
 
 126. See supra note 125.  
 127. Bill 64, Defending Employees’ Rights Act (Collective Bargaining and 
Financial Disclosure by Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.); Bill 78, Defending Em-
ployees’ Rights Act (Collective Bargaining and Financial Disclosure by Trade 
Unions), 2012 (Ont.). 
 128. Bill 62, Defending Employees’ Rights Act (Certification of Trade Un-
ions), 2013 (Ont.); Bill 94, Labour Relations Amendment Act (Bargaining 
Units and Certification of Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.). 
 129. Bill 63, Labour Relations Amendment Act (Ontario Labour Relations 
Board), 2013 (Ont.). 
 130. Bill 94, Labour Relations Amendment Act (Bargaining Units and Cer-
tification of Trade Unions), 2013 (Ont.). 
 131. Bill 73, Fair and Open Tendering Act (Labour Relations for Certain 
Public Sector Employers in the Construction Industry), 2013 (Ont.); Bill 74, 
Fairness and Competitiveness in Ontario's Construction Industry Act, 2013 
(Ont.). 
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In a well-known 1992 article, Brian Etherington identified 
three streams of commentary regarding the Charter’s prospects 
for reforming labor law: liberal romantics (optimistic about the 
Charter’s potential to defend labor law from excessive govern-
ment incursions); realists or skeptics (wary of neoliberal inter-
pretation and application of the Charter to defeat existing pro-
tective labor legislation); and pragmatic pluralists (though 
concerned about appropriateness of courts as a forum for decid-
ing labor policy issues, optimistic that courts would only inter-
vene when appropriate).132 He left it open whether the realists 
or pluralists would be proven right, concluding that only ro-
mantics were consistently disappointed by the Charter.133
Although Health Services was cause for some romantic re-
vival, many commentators, including Etherington, remained 
skeptical and greeted the decision with strong criticism.
  
134 Har-
ry Arthurs, among the most prominent Charter skeptics, may 
also be fairly described as skeptical of the prospects of constitu-
tions in general—at least juridical constitutions—for advancing 
or protecting labor and social concerns.135 He views courts and, 
therefore Charter litigation, as an undesirable forum for ad-
dressing labor issues, contrasting courts’ belief in “normativity 
to transform reality” with the economic and social forces pro-
ducing legal norms.136
 
 132. Brian Etherington, An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws 
Under the Charter: Of Realists, Romantics, and Pragmatists, 24 OTTAWA L. 
REV. 685, 688–95 (1992) [hereinafter Etherington, Judicial Review]. 
  
 133. Id. at 726–28. 
 134. See, e.g., Beth Bilson, Developments in Labour Law: The 2010–2011 
Term—Was Health Services a Mistake? The Supreme Court Decision in Fraser 
v. Ontario, 55 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 285, 313–14 (2011) (criticizing the deci-
sion’s lack of clear guidelines); Etherington, Health Services, supra note 37, at 
732 (describing the majority’s reasoning as “schizophrenic”); Fudge, supra note 
38, at 34–36 (arguing that the majority’s concept of the right to collective bar-
gaining is too qualified); Brian Langille, The Freedom of Association Mess: 
How We Got into It and How We Can Get out of It, 54 MCGILL L.J. 177, 179–81 
(2009) (arguing that the majority misunderstood Canadian labor law history, 
Canadian international labor obligations, and the Charter values themselves); 
Eric Tucker, The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of 
Labour History in the Supreme Court of Canada, 61 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 151, 
152 (2008) (criticizing the majority’s description of the history of labor law in 
Canada). 
 135. See, e.g., Arthurs, Multiple Models, supra note 52, at 403; Arthurs, 
Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 45–46; Arthurs, Shrugging, supra note 54, 
at 375–78. 
 136. See Arthurs, Shrugging, supra note 54, at 379–80. 
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Moreover, Arthurs is critical of the juridification of public 
life through Charter litigation.137 He contends the Charter has 
negatively affected social interests: diverting marginalized 
groups’ scarce resources away from direct action and political 
solutions into Charter litigation, diverting public resources 
from social programs to legal proceedings, emphasizing adver-
sarial over informal procedures, transforming corporations into 
rights and freedoms wearing citizens, weakening the activist 
state, and fostering neo-liberalism.138 Arthurs also concludes (in 
part based on empirical research that constitutions don’t pro-
duce significant social, economic or political change) that “con-
stitutions count for something: but not that much.”139
In addition, as outlined earlier, Charter rights and free-
doms, including FOA, are not absolute. The tests courts apply 
when ruling on Charter rights and freedoms, and justifiable 
limitations on these, are suffused with social and cultural 
norms and value judgments. 
 
Furthermore, they are subject to change as these norms 
and values develop. In Health Services, for instance, in reject-
ing the rationale underpinning the Labour Trilogy, the SCC 
stated that: “a review of the jurisprudence leads to the conclu-
sion that the holdings in the [Labour Trilogy cases]. . . can no 
longer stand. None of the reasons provided by the majorities in 
those cases survive scrutiny. . . .”140
Finally, Charter rights and freedoms are also subject to the 
Section 1 “saving” section, which provides that these rights and 
freedoms are “subject . . . to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democrat-
ic society.”
 In essence, the SCC was 
driven by a new conception of the role of labor relations to re-
verse two decades of jurisprudence. 
141
 
 137. See Harry W. Arthurs, Governing the Canadian State: The Constitu-
tion in an Era of Globalization, Neo-Liberalism, Populism, Decentralization 
and Judicial Activism, 13 CONST. F. 16, 21 (2003) [hereinafter Arthurs, Gov-
erning]. 
 Although vague, and granting the courts enor-
mous discretion over fundamental freedoms, Section 1 has been 
described as “arguably one of the most important statements of 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 16; Harry Arthurs & Brent Arnold, Does the Charter Matter?, 11 
REV. CONST. STUD. 37 (2005) (empirical study of Charter effects). 
 140. Health Services & Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. 
British Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, para. 36 (Can.). 
 141. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 s.1 (U.K.). 
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[Canada’s] democratic polity.”142 Notably, Section 1 was incor-
porated into the Charter in deliberate distinction from the ab-
solute guarantees in the U.S. Bill of Rights, out of concern that 
excessive protection of liberty would jeopardize Canadian val-
ues of community and representative democracy.143
The “Oakes test” used to determine whether Section 1 is 
satisfied sets out a two-step test.
  
144 The first branch asks 
whether the violation has a pressing and substantial objec-
tive.145 The second branch asks whether the means of achieving 
the objective is proportional, based on whether the means is ra-
tionally connected to the objective, whether it minimally im-
pairs the right or freedom, and whether there is proportionality 
between the violation and objective.146 The Oakes test is a fac-
tual, contextual inquiry with social and cultural norms en-
grained in each branch of the test.147 Consequently, the Section 
1 saving provision is a powerful mechanism which, in its grant 
of judicial discretion, may serve to incorporate values into the 
application of Charter protections.148
Recalling the Lavigne and Advance Cutting cases intro-
duced earlier, a shift in the SCC’s views towards favoring 
recognition of a freedom of non-association clearly developed in 
the decade between the decisions.
 
149 The decisions plainly (and 
often explicitly) incorporated social values into both the inter-
pretations of the FOA and, most crucially, into application of 
the Section 1 saving provision.150 It is not at all certain that if 
similar issues came before the Court today that they would be 
met with similar results.151
 
 142. Errol Mendes, The Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. Judi-
cial Deference in the Context of Section 1, in CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS 
AND FREEDOMS 165, 166 (Gérald-A. Beaudoin & Errol Mendes eds., 4th ed. 
2005). 
 In part, this may be due to shifting 
social values which could lead to a very different application of 
Section 1. Indeed, Advance Cutting would have had the oppo-
 143. Id. at 168. 
 144. R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.). 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 106. 
 147. See id. at 105–06.  
 148. See Mendes, supra note 142, at 167. 
 149. See supra Part IV. 
 150. See R. v. Advance Cutting & Corning Ltd., [2001] S.C.R. 209, at 211–
14 (Can.), 216; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 
S.C.R. 211, at 214–16 (Can.). 
 151. See Bilson, supra note 134, at 313; Etherington, Health Services, su-
pra note 37, at 744–45; Mendes, supra note 142, at 210–14.  
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site result—finding an unjustifiable violation of the freedom of 
non-association—had a single justice not concluded that the 
impugned provision satisfied the Oakes test.152
Therefore, Charter litigation is an uncertain strategy for 
labor to resort to in resisting the current tide of anti-union ef-
forts.
 
153
D. RESISTANCE: LABOR MOBILIZATION  
 
A second form of labor resistance that has appeared is mo-
bilization in the form of strategic union mergers. In August 
2013 two of Canada’s largest private sector unions, the Canadi-
an Auto Workers union (CAW) and the Communications, Ener-
gy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) merged to create 
a new union, “Unifor.”154 Unifor is now the largest private sec-
tor union in Canada, representing over 300,000 workers across 
twenty sectors of the economy, and with a significant public 
sector presence.155
The overarching goal of this merger was to establish a 
strong, militant union with strategic organizing and bargaining 
strengths, and with social unionism as its animating philoso-
phy.
 
156 Rather than a defensive move or “desperate act,” CAW 
and CEP insist that this initiative is a “positive opportunity” to 
respond to the challenging economic and political climate and 
the associated decline in union power, and marks renewal and 
revitalization of the union movement.157
Unifor regards the breadth and depth of its presence across 
the country and across several key industries as a source of 
  
 
 152. See Advance Cutting, [2001] S.C.R. at 216 (Iacobucci, J., arguing that 
the legislation violated Section 2(d) of the Charter, but was justified under 
Section 1 because of the legislation’s promotion of “social and economic objec-
tives” in a “unique and complex historical context”). 
 153. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that not all union security 
provisions will be subject to Charter scrutiny. Those existing in private sector 
collective agreements, for instance, will clearly be beyond Charter review. See 
Health Services & Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. British 
Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 88 (clarifying that the Charter applies 
only to state action).  
 154. Jeff Mackey, Unifor, Canada’s Newest Union, Formed as CAW, CEP 
Merge, HUFFINGTON POST CAN., Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 
2013/08/31/unifor-caw-cep-merger_n_3847388. 
 155. CAW CEP PROPOSAL COMM., TOWARDS A NEW UNION: CAW CEP 
PROPOSAL COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 9–10 (2012), available at http://www 
.newunionproject.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Final.Report.pdf.  
 156. Id. at 18–19. 
 157. Id. at 5–6, 8. 
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strength in bargaining power, in pursuing industrial and eco-
nomic strategies promoting good jobs in these sectors, and in 
responding to government policy and initiatives relating to 
structural and technical changes in these industries.158 Unifor 
regards this as crucial for certain federally regulated sectors 
undergoing significant reform.159
Unifor plans to focus on organizing, including prioritizing 
increasing representation in leading industries and geographic 
areas where it already has a substantial presence,
  
160 and em-
phasizing corporate campaigns161 and use of neutrality agree-
ments162 which, to this point, have not been a prominent feature 
of the Canadian labor relations landscape. Another innovative 
strategy is the creation of “Community Chapters” open for 
membership to a broad array of “workers” who are not in a cer-
tified or voluntarily recognized bargaining unit.163 Goals of the 
Community Chapter strategy include increasing Unifor’s mem-
bership, building its credibility with the public as benefiting all 
workers, providing a means for training future union leaders, 
and supporting organizing efforts among these workers.164 In 
this way Unifor hopes to set the foundation for future success-
ful organizing campaigns and “build a culture of collective ac-
tion and union solidarity” within non-unionized workplaces and 
among unrepresented workers.165
A second significant union merger was also attempted in 
2013. The Telecommunications Workers Union (TWU), repre-
senting about 13,000 workers, primarily in the federally regu-
lated telecommunications sector,
 
166
 
 158. See id. at 9–10. 
 arrived at a tentative mer-
ger agreement with the United Steelworkers of Canada 
 159. See id. at 10. 
 160. Id. at 29; UNIFOR, UNIFOR ORGANIZING POLICY 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.newunionconvention.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/675 
-Organizing-Policy-fin.pdf. 
 161. CAW CEP PROPOSAL COMM., supra note 155, at 33. 
 162. UNIFOR, supra note 160, at 7. 
 163. UNIFOR, supra note 160, at 11; see also CAW CEP PROPOSAL COMM., 
supra note 155, at 30 (asserting the union’s goal to organize workers who 
“cannot feasibly organize a certified bargaining unit”).  
 164. UNIFOR, BROADENING UNION CITIZENSHIP: UNIFOR’S MEMBERS IN 
COMMUNITY CHAPTERS 1–5 (2013), http//www.newunionconvention.ca/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/08/676-Union-Citizenship-web-ENG.pdf; UNIFOR, supra 
note 160, at 11–12.  
 165. UNIFOR, supra note 160, at 11.  
 166. Updated Frequently Asked Questions, TELECOMM. WORKERS UNION 
(Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.twu-stt.ca/en/updated-frequently-asked-questions. 
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(USW),167 one of Canada’s largest unions, representing approx-
imately 225,000 workers predominantly in the private sector.168 
This merger was also motivated by the unions’ desire to 
strengthen their bargaining power and political voice, and spe-
cifically to secure greater influence over federal labor policy.169 
However, the TWU membership vote on the merger failed by 
less than three percent.170 Although the merger will not pro-
ceed, the unions will continue to participate in the strategic al-
liance they established in 2010.171
The lack of corporatist institutions has been identified as 
an important reason why Canada is more susceptible to the ef-
fects of globalization than are many other countries, and why 
labor is disadvantaged in addressing increasingly centralized 
government authority and policy making.
 
172 William Coleman 
points, in particular, to the failure of labor to create organiza-
tions that are vertically integrated, highly representative, and 
cross class boundaries.173
Although the Unifor and USW-TWU mergers may over-
come some of the problems created by the mismatch between 
federal and provincial jurisdiction relevant to economic and la-
bor relations issues identified by Arthurs,
 
174
 
 167. Telecommunications Workers Union and United Steelworkers An-
nounce Merger Agreement, UNITED STEELWORKERS (Aug. 29, 2013), http:// 
www.usw.ca/media/news/releases?id=0899 [hereinafter Merger Agreement]. 
 it will likely only 
be effective in a few federally-regulated industries where the 
unions have a high degree of both breadth and depth of repre-
sentation. It is unlikely to bring substantial benefits at the pro-
vincial level of law and policy making. Most fundamentally, 
 168. About the United Steelworkers: Making Lives Better for Workers, 
UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.ca/union/who/about?id=0002 (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2014).  
 169. Merger Agreement, supra note 167; Updated Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, supra note 166.  
 170. TWU-Steelworkers Merger Falls Just Short of 66 2/3% Approval 
Threshold, TELECOMM. WORKERS UNION (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.twu 
-stt.ca/en/twu-steelworkers-merger-falls-just-short-66-23-approval-threshold. 
 171. Strengthening Our Strategic Alliance with the USW, TELECOMM. 
WORKERS UNION (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.twu-stt.ca/en/strengthening-our 
-strategic-alliance-usw. For the full text of motion, see TELECOMM. WORKERS 
UNION, MOVING FORWARD WITH THE TWU-USW STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 1 
(2013), http://www.twu-stt.ca/pdf/13-11-22_Hotline_English.pdf. 
 172. See William D. Coleman, Business, Labour, and Redistributive Poli-
tics, in INEQUALITY AND THE FADING OF REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS 94 (Keith 
Banting & John Myles eds., 2013). 
 173. Id. at 93–94, 111. 
 174. Arthurs, Real Constitution, supra note 3, at 62. 
  
2014] WHITHER WAGNER 1837 
 
neither merged union represents a substantial portion of the 
public sector.175 Given that over seventy-five percent of union-
ized workers in Canada are in the public sector,176 a union that 
does not represent a large proportion of these workers cannot 
be the type of highly representative, vertically integrated or-
ganization Coleman describes.177
E. RESISTANCE: STRATEGIC POLITICS 
 Therefore, while these mer-
gers may marginally increase collective bargaining power, and 
perhaps substantially in certain sectors, they are not likely to 
mark a significant revitalization of the labor movement. 
A third dimension of labor resistance takes the form of 
strategic labor politics. Unions in Canada have been formally 
allied with federal and provincial level social democratic politi-
cal parties since the founding of the CCF in 1932.178 In recent 
decades, these political parties have primarily been the federal 
and provincial New Democratic Party (NDP), founded in 1961 
as an alliance between the CCF and the Canada Labour Con-
gress (CLC), and in Québec, the Parti Québecois (PQ).179 Some 
commentators credit the political leverage these alliances pro-
vided with Canadian unions’ success in obtaining a favorable 
legislative environment for labor.180
For a time, these appeared to be vital partnerships, partic-
ularly following the tensions of the 1970s and 80s, arising from 
government restraint and anti-inflation policies, when orga-
nized labor made great efforts to realize its political influ-
ence.
 
181
 
 175. See CAW CEP PROPOSAL COMM., supra note 
 However, by the mid-1990s, these alliances showed 
161, at 9–10 (showing 
that members in public sectors like health, education, and transit make up 
less than a third of the union); supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
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growing strain and even rupture.182 There has been a growing 
view within parts of the NDP that, as one commentator de-
scribes it: “the NDP was doing labour a favour, that socialism 
could exist without labour and that labour, not socialism, was 
the problem in the NDP’s not being able to attract the working 
and common people.”183 Notably, for its 2012 federal leadership 
convention the NDP eliminated its practice of reserving a quar-
ter of votes for affiliated labor unions.184
At the same time, many within organized labor regard the 
NDP as having betrayed workers and unions and removed their 
political voice with a rightward shift on economic and social 
policies.
  
185 These divisions have produced strategic voting cam-
paigns, new Liberal-union alliances, and public ruptures of 
NDP-union alliances.186
Beginning with Ontario labor’s rejection of the provincial 
NDP party after a disastrous term in government ending in 
1995,
 
187 we have seen very public and determined repudiation 
by labor of its former political ally, including segments of labor 
breaking from their traditional support for the NDP and PQ in 
federal and provincial elections and urging members to engage 
in strategic voting for other parties and candidates.188 Strategic 
voting campaigns attempt to avoid having the vote split among 
non-right-of-center parties.189 Generally this involves support-
ing Liberal candidates where the NDP or PQ candidate is 
weak: in short, voting for the party most likely to defeat the 
right-of-center candidate in that riding.190
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curity in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 
 182. Larry Savage, Organized Labour and the Politics of Strategic Voting, 
in RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF LABOUR IN CANADA 75, 77 (Stephanie Ross & 
Larry Savage eds., 2012). 
 183. Larry Zolf, Alexa the Great, CBC NEWS VIEWPOINT (June 6, 2002), 
http://archive.is/0rJML. 
 184. Joan Bryden, Unions Still Influential in NDP Race, CHRON. HERALD, 
Feb. 23, 2012, http://thechronicleherald.ca/canada/66122-unions-still 
-influential-ndp-race. 
 185. Savage, supra note 182, at 77; Swartz & Warskett, supra note 181, at 
28–29. 
 186. Savage, supra note 182, at 75, 77–78, 80–81. 
 187. See id. at 77; Swartz & Warskett, supra note 181, at 28–29. 
 188. See Savage, supra note 182, at 77–78, 80–82. 
 189. Id. at 75–76. 
 190. Id. at 76. 
  
2014] WHITHER WAGNER 1839 
 
A related strategy has been the formation of multi-union 
organizations to endorse Liberal candidates and engage in elec-
tion advertising.191 These include the Ontario Election Network, 
composed of the CAW, several public sector unions, and build-
ing trades unions;192 and the Working Families Coalition 
(WFC), including teachers unions, the CAW, and several build-
ing trades unions’, which have been very active in recent pro-
vincial Ontario elections.193
Not all of organized labor favors strategic voting, and this 
division was very apparent in the 2006 federal election.
 
194 The 
CLC chose not to formally support any party or candidate, in-
stead urging members to vote based on issues that affect work-
ers.195 Meanwhile the British Columbia Federation of Labour 
continued its traditional support of the NDP.196 In contrast, 
CAW President Buzz Hargrove publicly supported the incum-
bent Liberal government in most of the country while also urg-
ing Québec union members to vote for the Bloc Québecois as it 
was more likely than Liberals to defeat the Conservatives Qué-
bec.197 In response, the NDP revoked Hargrove’s party member-
ship,198 and the CAW then publicly broke with the NDP, direct-
ing its members not to support the party.199 The USW has 
publicly criticized the CAW’s action as short-sighted and has 
continued to support the NDP.200
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In addition to likely weakening the NDP, as Larry Savage 
points out, “the strategic voting approach demonstrated that 
the labour movement could not speak with a unified voice, let 
alone in its own voice, on the question of labour’s political vi-
sion.”201
VI.  CONCLUSION   
 
John Godard’s Historical-Institutionalist and Harry Ar-
thurs’s “Real” Constitution perspectives offer a means of inter-
preting historical and current RTW initiatives and assessing 
whether, unlike in the past, anti-labor changes will succeed in 
taking root in Canada. Should this be the case, then Canada’s 
labor relations and unionization will likely come to resemble 
that of the United States, marked by sharp, continued decline. 
If, however, these efforts fail to establish lasting change, Cana-
da may continue to trace its own experience with the Wagner 
model. 
The RTW issue is one that, especially in Canada, exists at 
the tension point between the juridical and “real” constitutions, 
and challenges some of the nation’s longstanding social, politi-
cal, and institutional norms. It may prove to be an example of 
the overwhelming power of the “real” constitution and shifts in 
values and norms to define our labor law and policy. This may 
be a point of historical departure for Canadian labor. 
Godard is optimistic about the durability and resilience of 
Canadian Historical-Institutionalist values that have deter-
mined how the Wagner model has played out in this country,202 
while Arthurs is more pessimistic about the overwhelming 
power of changes in the nation’s “real” constitution.203
It would be rash to attempt to predict the outcome of these 
simultaneously complex and subtle events. Godard’s optimism 
may be realistic; Arthurs’s pessimism may be warranted. As 
these events play out we will learn whether, despite the greater 
protection offered by Canada’s juridical constitution, a linger-
ing Red Tory influence, and labor’s resistance, the nation’s “re-
al” constitution, institutional norms, and values have under-
 Although 
labor is engaged in an array of strategic resistance, it is not 
clear that it will be sufficient to once again succeed against an-
ti-labor forces. 
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gone greater, countervailing change such that labor law will 
follow. 
 
